On November 23, 2025, the Serbian entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia (Republika Srpska, RS), held an early presidential election that saw Sini?a Karan win a narrow victory with 50.8% of the vote. The candidate from former president Milorad Dodik’s Independent Social Democratic Party(Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD) defeated Branko Blanu?a of the Serbian Democratic Party(Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), who won 48.8% of the vote.
The election came after a period of considerable political turbulence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, following Milorad Dodik’s conviction on February 26, 2025 by the country’s Constitutional Court for defying the authority of theOffice of the High Representative(OHR). The conviction led to Milorad Dodik’s removal from the political scene and the calling of early elections.
The close outcome of the presidential election illustrates, on the one hand, the SNSD’s ability to maintain its hold on the local political apparatus, but also, on the other hand, the gradual weakening of the party and Dodik’s leadership, and the beginning of a recomposition of the RS political landscape.
An institutional system inherited from Dayton
Bosnia-Herzegovina has operated since the Dayton Peace Accords (which marked the end of the armed conflict in 1995, and whose Annex 4 constitutes the Constitution) on a model of ethnic consociationalism and complex federalism.The state is made up of two territorial entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, itself divided into ten cantons, the majority of which are Bosnian-Croat; and the Republika Srpska, which is more centralized. These entities are supplemented by municipalities and the autonomous district of Brcko. The state level comprises two parliamentary assemblies (the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples), whose composition reflects the sharing of power between the country’s constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs (according to the latest census, carried out in 2013, the country is made up of 50.1% Bosniaks, 30.8% Serbs, 15.4% Croats and 3.7% "Others") Others" ). The system is overseen by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an international institution charged with overseeing Dayton’s civilian implementation, and endowed with broad "Bonn powers" enabling it to impose laws or dismiss officials.
The current High Representative, German Christian Schmidt, appointed in 2021 by the countries of the PeaceImplementation Council (PIC), is contested by Republika Srpska and Russia, which refuse to recognize his legitimacy due to the absence of UN Security Council endorsement for his appointment. This refusal to support Christian Schmidt is part of the Russian and Chinese plan to abolish the Office of the High Representative in order to expand their sphere of influence in the country and destabilize this region on the borders of the European Union.
The dominant political figure in the RS, 66-year-old Milorad Dodik, President of the RS from 2010 to 2018 and from 2022 to 2025, began his career in 1996 as a moderate political player supported by Western states, before taking a nationalist turn in 2006. He gradually established himself as the country’s leading Serbian political leader, developing radical Serbian nationalist rhetoric, hate speech and a power system based on corruption and clientelism that earned him several international sanctions. His political style then focused on secessionist rhetoric, advocating the independence of the Serbian entity.
Elections dominated by Milorad Dodik
Despite his repeated declarations that he would not submit to the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dodik finally accepted the court’s decision to convert his one-year prison sentence into an 18,000 euro fine, thus implicitly recognizing the authority of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina.Following his conviction by the Bosnian courts, Dodik was quick to appoint a member of his close entourage, Ana Tri?ic Babic , as interim president, despite the absence of any legal basis for this appointment. Dodik and the political elite standing behind him initially opposed the organization of a new presidential election in RS, and the former RS president again threatened to organize a referendum on the subject, before backtracking on this idea. The appointment of Ana Tri?ic Babic illustrates the SNSD’s strategy of institutional "occupation", aimed at retaining executive leverage regardless of judicial or international decisions. The episode reinforced the image of a RS executive ready to bypass formal norms to extend its influence.
The election campaign reproduced the recurring features of Dodik’s political style and environment. Mobilizing his usual register of aggressive Serbian nationalism and secessionist narrative, Dodik saturated the media space with divisive rhetoric. Karan, for his part, presented himself as the guarantor of continuity, backed by his technocratic profile and his roots in the security apparatus as former Minister of the Interior. Facing Karan, the SDS put forward Branko Blanu?a, a little-known academic with no broad political roots, an opposition strategy that failed to embody a credible alternative to the SNSD.
Procedurally, the election was marred by allegations of irregularities in several polling stations, notably in the towns of Doboj and Zvornik, where the opposition and the Central Electoral Commission(Centralna Izborna Komisija, CIK), which was responsible for organizing and supervising the entire election, were unable to reach agreement.the opposition and the Central Electoral Commission (Centralna Izborna Komisija, CIK), responsible for organizing and supervising all elections in the country, have denounced practices involving the misuse of public funds during the campaign, pressure on voters and anomalies in the voting lists.
These incidents are part of structural trends of clientelism, capture of local administrations and fragility of electoral guarantees. Networks of economic and administrative dependence (public jobs, contracts, transfers) remain powerful instruments of mobilization and political control in RS.
Behind-the-scenes diplomatic and financial maneuvering also played a part. The partial and contested easing of international pressure was exploited by the pro-Dodik side. In October 2025, the US sanctions imposed on its close-knit network since 2017 were lifted, enabling the pro-Dodik camp to assert that it had obtained a form of international "rehabilitation" and display an electoral argument of legitimization.
The lifting of these sanctions is part of a long lobbying campaign probably financed by RS public money. At the same time, Russia and Hungary maintained visible political support, marked by congratulatory messages and bilateral meetings, reinforcing the narrative that the RS had international sponsors in the face of the West.
A turning point for the SNSD and Dodik’s political future?
However, these elections signal an important change in Milorad Dodik’s political career and the SNSD’s popularity, which appears to be waning. Indeed, Dodik’s six-year ban from public office opens up a period of uncertainty for the SNSD, already marked by the wear and tear of power, and could encourage some of its executives and members to distance themselves to preserve their own political careers.For the time being, Karan’s election ensures the continuity of a political model centred on partisan control of institutions, the politicization of the security forces and the flow of resources to clientelist networks.
The opposition, weakened by the choice of a low-profile candidate and the absence of a unified strategy, has emerged weakened and risks being unable to play its role as an effective counterweight.
However, the narrow victory of the SNSD candidate and the very low turnout underline a growing disenchantment. The political elite seems far removed from the concrete needs of RS citizens, in favor of rhetoric focused on alleged ethnonational tensions. The latest SNSD election results, down on previous cycles, confirm an erosion of popular support. Moreover, the non-participation in the presidential elections of one of the most popular parties in RS, the Party for Democratic Progress(Partija Demokratskog Progresa, PDP), should have ensured an easy victory for Karan over SDS, whose popular support has also been eroded in recent years. Karan’s success was thus due to the weakness of the opposition’s strategy, rather than the popularity of the SDS.
Internationally, Karan’s victory maintains Dodik’s geopolitical ties with Moscow and Budapest, while Western partners, despite certain sanctions and interventions against Dodik, such as those of Germany and Austria, are struggling to impose lasting structural corrections.
Moreover, this election period has seen the emergence of a period of tension with Aleksandar Vucic , the Serbian president, with whom Milorad Dodik is very close. In particular, Belgrade expressed its dissatisfaction with the appointment of Ana Tri?ic Babic and the sudden withdrawal of certain laws declared unconstitutional, notably those under which Dodik had been convicted by the courts. Belgrade’s unease probably stems from the fact that, by complying with Bosnian court rulings and withdrawing unconstitutional laws, Dodik implicitly recognized the authority of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s central institutions. However, this sequence ran counter to the strategy of Vucic, who has historically taken advantage of RS-led institutional contestation to maintain a discreet influence and controlled political instability within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In conclusion, the recent presidential election confirmed that the Bosnian problem is not one of ethnonational rivalry. Clientelism, weak institutions and the capture of the public media create a breeding ground for increasingly authoritarian, personalized governance, centralized around the Dodik clan. Without strong institutional reforms and the restoration of independent mechanisms of control, the RS finds itself in a cycle of normalizing personalized power with the SNSD at its head, despite the willingness of opposition parties, even if they are mostly part of a Serbian nationalist ideological current, to collaborate with central institutions and ease the cyclical tensions initiated by Milorad Dodik.
Neira Sabanovic , Doctorante en science politique, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) This article is republished from The Conversation under Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.
